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Abstract: Although personality has been one of the most-studied factors  
in management and decision-making research, this stream of research has 
generated inconsistent support for the relationship between personality traits 
and individuals’ susceptibility to heuristics, and therefore biased judgment. The 
aim of this study is to investigate how the provision of correct information and 
individual difference factors influence susceptibility to anchoring effect. To test 
this hypothesis, individual levels of the personality traits have been measured. 
Then, participants were provided with an anchoring task involving the Taj 
Mahal either providing them correct information before the experiment or not. 
Providing individuals with the correct information limited susceptibility to the 
irrelevant anchor; even if only 33% of those exactly recalled it when providing 
the estimate. High values in agreeableness and openness to experience were 
found to be related with reduced susceptibility to the anchor. 
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1 Introduction 
The bounded rationality of individuals’ decision-making processes is a widely studied 
topic in management studies. Managers, as human beings, are not perfectly rational, and 
have emotional and cognitive limitations (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1957). 
Decision-making studies examine managers’ information-processing capabilities and 
their influence on judgment formation and behavioural processes (i.e., in this journal: 
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Albar and Jetter, 2013; Jones, 2007; Podvezko, 2007; Sikder, 2008; Sjoberg, 2007; 
Ustinovichius, 2007). Among those studies, Herbert Simon’s work on bounded 
rationality represents the main background theory. In this stream, scholars have addressed 
the issue of cognitive biases affecting decision-making processes, in a continuous effort 
to find an explanation to why human misperceptions can occur. Following up Simon’s 
studies on human cognition, Stanovich and West (2000) proposed dividing cognitive 
functioning in two systems. System 1 is intuitive, automatic, effortless, implicit and 
emotional, while System 2 is reflective, slower, conscious, effortful and rational 
(Kahneman, 2003). On the one hand, the first System is considered to be more rapid and 
instinctive. An example of this is when we duck because a ball is thrown at us 
unexpectedly. On the other hand, the reflective system is more deliberate and  
self-conscious. For example, we use it when planning our next trip. One way to think 
about all this is that the automatic system is our gut feeling and the reflective system is 
our conscious thought (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Gut feelings can be quite accurate, or 
‘good enough’ (Albar and Jetter, 2013), even in managerial contexts. Moreover, people 
often make mistakes because they rely too much on the automatic system (Chugh, 2004). 
Since System 1 is faster than System 2 in making decisions, people have developed 
thousands of simplifying strategies or rules of thumb, so-called heuristics. 
Heuristics are commonly defined as simplifying strategies to cope with complex 
issues and problems. In their study, Newell and Simon (1972) defined heuristics as those 
cognitive shortcuts that the human brain tends to use when its decision-making process is 
limited, in terms of both time and availability of data. People frequently use rules of 
thumb to make judgments in real life, and although they can be very quick and helpful, 
their use was found to lead to systematic biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In fact, 
heuristics produce accurate or partially accurate judgments and it may be inevitable that 
people will adopt some of them (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). Heuristics can be applied 
by almost everyone, as researches have demonstrated that their use is not specific to 
particular individuals (Bazerman and Moore, 2009; Plous, 1993). For example, managers 
have been recently found to rely on heuristics in decisions concerning project screening 
(Albar and Jetter, 2013). 
The reliability on heuristics can produce a biased decision-making process and a 
biased result, which is more likely to occur in System 1-thinking than in System 2 
(Bazerman and Moore, 2009). A bias can be defined as the human tendency to make 
systematic errors in certain circumstances based on cognitive factors rather than evidence 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Hammond et al. (2001) proposed one of the most 
interesting interpretations of cognitive biases in decision making; they called them 
‘hidden traps’, for considering all those situations in which the human brain is 
abnormally deviating from deciding rationally. A biased managerial decision-making 
process can affect a wide range of decisions and environments, such as groups  
(i.e., Sikder, 2008). For example, it could distort beliefs (i.e., Sjoberg, 2007), affect 
estimates (i.e., Podvezko, 2007) or valuations (i.e., Meszek, 2007), and increase the 
reliability on subjective approach (i.e., Ustinovichius, 2007). 
The aim of this study is to investigate how the provision of correct information and 
individual difference factors influence the susceptibility to the anchoring effect. The 
anchoring effect is the phenomenon under which individuals, when making estimates, 
rely more on subjective irrelevant data and information. This paper, after having 
introduced the topic of decision-making biases, will provide a theoretical background on 
the anchoring effect to introduce the research and provide context. Consequently, the 
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methods and the results of the study will be discussed in terms of future research 
direction, theoretical and managerial implications. 
2 Theoretical framework 
This section of the paper presents a brief introduction on the research that has been done 
with reference to the anchoring effect, which relates to the decision-making process when 
individuals make estimates for values (i.e., Chapman and Bornstein, 1996; Northcraft  
and Neale, 1987; Plous, 1989, 1993). The decision-making literature predicts that an 
individual will make their estimate based upon an initial value – derived from past 
events, random assignment, or whatever information is available – and typically make 
insufficient adjustments from that anchor when establishing a final value (Bazerman and 
Moore, 2009). 
Anchoring on unreliable information appears to pose a significant risk to the quality 
of individual judgment, even when objectively appropriate anchors are available (Whyte 
and Sebenius, 1997). The initial value(s) may be drawn from memory or experience, or 
may be supplied by others. When based on irrelevant or no longer pertinent information, 
faulty decisions are likely to result. When making forecasts, people often use the past as 
the starting point. While the past may be relevant, the environment may offer other 
pertinent clues to the future. Illuminating potential anchoring biases may enable decision 
makers to examine the information they are considering (Plous, 1989; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). 
The anchoring effect appears to be prevalent throughout human decision processes 
and has been shown to reliably influence judgments in a variety of domains, other than 
probability estimates (Plous, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), including negotiation 
(i.e., Caputo, 2013; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Ritov, 
1996), legal judgments (i.e., Chapman and Bornstein, 1996), and general knowledge  
(i.e., Epley and Gilovich, 2001; McElroy and Dowd, 2007; Mussweiler and Englich, 
2005; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999, 2001; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Furthermore, 
anchoring effects appear viable across most situations for both novices and experts  
(i.e., Northcraft and Neale, 1987). 
There seems to be no difference between the effects produced by relevant anchors 
and irrelevant anchors. Furnham and Boo (2011), in a recent literature review, stated that 
irrelevant anchors produce similar effects in judgmental decisions in comparison to those 
of informational relevance anchors. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
randomly generated the anchor values by spinning a wheel of fortune; while, participants 
in Englich et al.’s (2006) study randomly acquired the anchors by throwing a set of dice, 
and Critcher and Gilovich (2008) found that the number on an athlete’s jersey could 
anchor estimations of his performance. 
Different factors have been analysed in order to investigate their relation with the 
anchoring effect, focusing chiefly on the role of mood, knowledge and experience. 
Significant results of affective factors on anchoring effects have been found 
(Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Englich and Soder, 2009). In addition, previous researches 
have provided empirical evidence demonstrating that decisions by expert participants in 
the judgmental domains also show an anchoring effect (Enough and Mussweiler, 2001; 
Englich et al., 2005, 2006; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987). These 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Relevant information, personality traits and anchoring effect 65    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
results imply that expertise does not significantly reduce the assimilative bias in decisions 
that affect inexperienced laypeople (Furnham and Boo, 2011). Anchoring effect thus 
appears to be a very robust psychological phenomenon, which does not influence all 
individuals equally. Identifying those factors that influence how and in what ways a 
person is susceptible to this heuristic should further the understanding of the process 
(Furnham and Boo, 2011). 
One avenue of approach is to investigate the role of individual difference factors 
(Furnham and Boo, 2011), which are the different responses generated by an individual 
toward specific events or circumstances in a way that is different from other people on a 
regular basis (Brandstätter, 1993). Previous studies pointed out the important role of the 
personality of the decision maker in risky choice situations (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981), and the influence of intellectual traits on decision-making and consequential 
choice preference (Stanovich and West, 1998, 2000). In addition, individual differences 
have been also found in terms of numerical reliance (Bartels, 2006; Peters et al., 2006), 
optimism (Buehler and Griffin, 2003), preference for actions or inactions (Baron and 
Ritov, 2004), and ambiguity (Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Nowlis et al., 2002). 
The aim of the current study is to investigate how individual difference factors may 
influence the reliability on an irrelevant anchor, and if individuals rely on irrelevant 
anchor even when provided with correct information. In fact, Whyte and Sebenius (1997) 
stated that anchoring on unreliable information appears to pose a significant risk to the 
quality of individual judgment, even when objectively appropriate anchors are available, 
assuming a recency effect. Therefore, a recency effect should be found in the study. 
Hypothesis 1 The availability of correct information does not influence the 
susceptibility to the anchoring effect. 
Furnham and Boo’s (2011) literature review on the anchoring effect claimed how there is 
limited research on the relationship between personality and the anchoring effect. Thus, 
due to the lack of sufficient empirical evidence to conclude on the effect of personality on 
anchoring, a gap in the literature is given and further studies are needed to investigate the 
relationship between these variables (Furnham and Boo, 2011). 
Personality is one of the individual difference variables that affects individuals’ 
performance and more specifically the cognitive processing in judgmental decisions 
(Furnham and Boo, 2011). Most of the research in the field related to personality has 
focused on the most widely tested and well-regarded Big-Five personality traits (Eroglu 
and Croxton, 2010; McElroy and Dowd, 2007). The personality traits that make up the 
so-called ‘Big Five’ are not traits themselves but rather dispositional categories under 
which a variety of specific traits may be subsumed (Barry and Friedman, 1998). 
According to Barrick and Mount (1991), these five factors include extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability/neuroticism, and openness to 
experience. 
Extraversion is a personality trait associated with being sociable, assertive, talkative 
and active. Empirical studies have been undertaken on mood and affect, associating 
positive mood states and the positive affect with the trait of extraversion. Furthermore, 
stemming from Bower’s (1981, 1991) ‘network theory of affect’, which suggests that 
positive (negative) moods produce more positive (negative) judgments, studies on the 
relationship between mood states and the anchoring effect have demonstrated that 
negative mood states lead participants to engage in more effortful information processing, 
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which is more prone to anchoring effect (Bodenhausen et al., 2000). Thus, it is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2a A high level of extraversion reduces susceptibility to the anchoring 
effect. 
Emotional stability is associated with being calm, even-tempered, and less likely to feel 
tense or rattled, while Neuroticism is associated with being depressed, tense, nervous, 
angry, unstable, discontented, worried, and uneasy. No empirical evidences have been 
found in the literature on the relationship between this trait and the anchoring effect 
(Furnham and Boo, 2011). The trait of neuroticism has been related with mood states and 
affect, and then with the trait of extraversion (Eroglu and Croxton, 2010). Stemming from 
Bower’s (1981, 1991) ‘network theory of affect’ and Rusting’s (1999) research, a similar 
effect of extraversion and neuroticism on judgments has been identified. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2b A high level of emotional stability reduces susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect. 
The traits of agreeableness, which is associated with being courteous, flexible, trusting, 
cooperative and tolerant; conscientiousness, which is associated with being careful, 
responsible and organised; and, openness to experience, which is associated with being 
imaginative, curious, original and open-minded, can be considered together. In fact, 
individuals with high conscientiousness and agreeableness (Bodenhausen et al., 2000; 
Eroglu and Croxton, 2010), as well as with high openness to experience (McElroy  
and Dowd, 2007) were found to be more susceptible to the anchoring effect. Furnham  
and Boo (2011) explained these results with the selective accessibility mechanism 
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999) and the attitudinal approach (Wegener et al., 2001) to the 
anchoring effect. 
Based on those theories, the following attitudes related to personality traits lead to the 
activation of confirmatory search and selective accessibility mechanisms of anchoring. 
Individuals expressing high levels of conscientiousness tend to engage in more thorough 
thought processes before making their judgments, while those with high agreeableness 
tend to take the provided anchors more seriously. Finally, high openness to experience 
influences individuals who are more sensitive to anchor cues (Furnham and Boo, 2011). 
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2c A high level of agreeableness increases susceptibility to the anchoring 
effect. 
Hypothesis 2d A high level of conscientiousness increases susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect. 
Hypothesis 2e A high level of openness to experience increases susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect. 
To test these hypotheses, individual levels of personality traits have been measured. 
Participants have then been provided with an anchoring task involving the Taj Mahal. 
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3 Method 
3.1 Participants and design 
The questionnaires have been submitted to a sample of 117 managers, professionals and 
academics recruited through the social network LinkedIn. The design of the study 
included the observed variables of personality traits, demography (such as gender, age, 
working experience), and the manipulated variable of anchor. Participants’ estimates of 
the date of completion of the Taj Mahal served as dependent variable. 
3.2 Procedure and materials 
All participants were first informed of the nature of the study. After consenting to take 
part in the study, in a totally anonymous way, participants were presented with 
demographic questions and the ten-item personality inventory, otherwise known as TIPI 
(Gosling et al., 2003). The TIPI includes two items for each of the Big-Five personality 
dimensions. Each item contains a pair of two trait descriptors and participants have to 
rate on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1, ‘disagree strongly’, up to 7, ‘agree 
strongly’, the extent to which the pair of traits applies to them (Gosling et al., 2003). The 
five-factor model (FFM) is currently the predominant model in trait psychology. The 
analyses suggested that the ten unipolar items of the TIPI could provide an efficient 
approximation for longer measures of the FFM personality constructs (Muck et al., 
2007). The choice to adopt the TIPI rather than a longer personality measure has been 
made to reduce transient measurement errors resulting from participant fatigue, 
frustration and boredom associated with completing several survey instruments in 
combination with a lengthy experimental session (Volk et al., 2011). 
As a measure for the Big-Five dimensions of personality, the TIPI has been validated 
against standard Big-Five instruments, finding generally positive results in terms of 
validity (Donnellan et al., 2006; Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2003; Jonason et al., 
2011; Lu and Kao, 2009; Volk et al., 2011). All these extensive validation studies have 
shown that the TIPI has acceptable psychometric properties even across different cultures 
and languages (Hofmans et al., 2008; Muck et al., 2007; Romero et al., 2012). The TIPI 
instrument has been used within different contexts of research, such as business and 
management (Tabaeian et al., 2012), individual and social preferences (Hesse et al., 
2005; Livosky et al., 2012), and clinical psychology (Bunevicius et al., 2008). The 
Cronbach’s alphas for the five TIPI scales in the current study were very similar to the 
findings by Volk et al. (2011), Donnellan et al. (2006), Ehrhart et al. (2009) and Gosling 
et al. (2003). Gosling et al. (2003) reported test-retest reliability for the five TIPI scales 
over a period of six weeks. They were 0.77 for extraversion, 0.71 for agreeableness,  
0.76 for conscientiousness, 0.70 for emotional stability and 0.62 for openness, indicating 
that the scale provides a stable measurement of personality over time. More recently, 
Romero et al. (2012) confirmed the same results. In sum, the TIPI has been considered a 
promising instrument for situations where brevity is a priority. 
After completing the TIPI scale, participants were presented with an anchoring task 
involving the Taj Mahal (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). In this task, participants were first 
asked to write the last three digits of their phone number preceded by the digit 1. Then 
participants were asked whether the Taj Mahal was completed before or after that year,  
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which served as the anchor. Finally, participants were asked to estimate the exact year of 
completion of the Taj Mahal. Half of the participants were presented with a brief story 
(from the Wikipedia.org page) about the Taj Mahal, in which the exact year of 
completion was mentioned (which was 1653). All participants were then informed about 
the nature of our study, thanked, and released from the study. 
3.3 An anchoring index 
Almost every study analysing the anchoring effect uses a procedure where the anchor is 
provided directly by the researcher and is computed in the analysis as low or high anchor 
in order to polarise results (i.e., Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Englich and Soder, 2009; 
Furnham and Boo, 2011; McElroy and Dowd, 2007). In the current study the anchor is 
not fixed, rather one could say a ‘mobile anchor’ was used. In order to deal with this 
issue and perform a correlation analysis in addition to a regression analysis, an anchoring 
index has been developed and calculated as follows. 
( , )AI f x z=  
x DIG EST= −  
z EST CORR= −  
DIG is the year composed by the three digits of the phone number of each respondent; 
EST is the estimate provided for the completion of Taj Mahal; and, CORR is the correct 
information provided (the year 1653). The variable x and z have been standardised to be 
in the range between 0 and 1. Therefore, the variable AI is explicated as follows. 
0, { }
1 , { }
z median z
AI
x z median z
<⎧= ⎨ − ≥⎩  
For the group who was not presented with the brief story of the Taj Mahal, the variable z 
is not applicable. Thus, the anchoring index is calculated as follows. 
1AI x= −  
The AI has a range of continuous values from 0 to 1. When closer to 0 there is no 
anchoring effect; when closer to 1 there is a strong anchoring effect. 
4 Results 
Hypothesis 1 assumes that the availability of correct information does not influence the 
susceptibility to the anchoring effect. Thus, the recency effect should exist. In order to 
investigate this relationship, a regression analysis with the anchoring index serving as 
independent variable has been performed by selecting the cases where the correct 
information was provided or not. Participants’ estimates of the year of completion of the 
Taj Mahal served as the dependent variable. In the cases without correct information, the 
analysis showed significant results (F (1, 52) = 17.30, p < .000) between the anchoring 
index and the estimation. Thus, the anchoring effect existed and affected the estimation 
judgment. However, in the cases where the correct information has been provided, the 
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analysis did not reveal the same significant results (F (1, 63) = .37, p < .54). Thus, 
hypothesis 1 is rejected; the hypothesised recency effect cannot be supported. 
In order to investigate whether the personality factors influenced participants’ 
susceptibility to the anchor, a regression analysis with a variable expressing whether or 
not they received correct information and participants’ personality trait scores serving as 
our independent variables have been performed. Participants’ anchoring index served as 
the dependent variable. This analysis showed significant results (F (1, 117) = 6.685,  
p < .000) on the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. R-square is a statistic that will give some information about the goodness of fit 
of a model. In regression, the R-square coefficient of determination is a statistical 
measure of how well the regression line approximates the real data points. An R-square 
of 1.0 indicates that the regression line perfectly fits the data. As can be noted from table 
1, only the variable expressing the correct information received had a significant relation 
in the model. 
Table 1 Output of the regression analysis 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate 
1 .517a 0.267 0.227 0.322884583 
ANOVAa 
Model  Sum of squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4,182 6 0.697 6.685 .000b 
 Residual 11,468 110 0.104   
 Total 15,65 116    
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised
coefficients Model 
 
B Std. error Beta 
t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1.101 0.251  4.393 0 
 INFORMATION 
RECEIVED 
–0.337 0.063 –0.459 –5.307 0 
 EXTRAVERSION 0.02 0.022 0.079 0.915 0.362 
 AGREEABLENESS –0.055 0.029 –0.169 –1.888 0.062 
 COSCIENTIOUSNESS 0.005 0.027 0.016 0.189 0.851 
 EMOTIONAL STABILITY 0.002 0.023 0.008 0.086 0.932 
 OPENNESS TO 
EXPERIENCE 
–0.05 0.03 –0.143 –1.665 0.099 
Notes: aDependent variable: anchoring index 
bPredictors: (CONSTANT), OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE, 
COSCIENTIOUSNESS, INFORMATION RECEIVED, AGREEABLENESS, 
EXTRAVERSION, EMOTIONAL STABILITY. 
In addition to the regression analysis, a correlation analysis has been performed with the 
calculated anchoring index as dependent variable and personality traits scores as 
independent variables. This analysis partially confirmed the regression results and two 
significant correlations have been found. The anchoring index has been found to be 
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negatively correlated with agreeableness (r (1, 117) = –.207, p = .025) and openness to 
experience (r (1, 117) = –.187, p = .044). This confirms the partially significant results of 
the coefficients in the regression analysis associated with the above mentioned 
personality traits. Thus, hypothesis 2c and 2e are rejected, while the analysis did not 
show any significant result about hypothesis 2a, 2b and 2d. 
5 Discussion 
The present work poses some important elements of originality in comparison with 
previous works concerning the anchoring effect. First, the sampling method and subject 
population in this paper are new in the field. The vast majority of studies on the 
anchoring effect used undergraduate students, while in the present study a population of 
seasoned managers and professionals has been analysed. Moreover, the sampling method 
was targeted in order to select individuals with educational background and experience 
the closest possible to a population of managers. On this account, the social network 
LinkedIn has been used to collect participants in the study. Second, no other studies have 
been found to adopt a ‘mobile’ anchor in the estimation task. Without counting the few 
studies analysing real data to prove the anchoring effect (i.e., Bokhari and Geltner, 2011), 
all the other studies provided participants with low versus high anchors in order to 
polarise results (i.e., Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Englich and Soder, 2009; Furnham and 
Boo, 2011; McElroy and Dowd, 2007; Nguyen and Schüßler, 2012). Even if this method 
is very useful to prove the existence of the anchoring effect, the same cannot be said in 
terms of realness. Third, in the present study the correct information has been put in 
competition with the anchor number, no other studies have been found analysing this 
relationship. 
That being said, partial support for the hypothesised relationships has been found. 
First, the expected result (hypothesis 1) about a recency effect that favoured the anchor 
relative to the correct information has not been confirmed by the analysis, in contrast 
with Whyte and Sebenius’ (1997) results. On the contrary, providing individuals with the 
correct information limited the individuals’ reliability on the irrelevant anchor. This 
finding does not have a strong support; in fact just 33% (N = 21) of the participants 
receiving the correct information exactly recalled it when estimating the year. This leaves 
space open for future research concerning managers’ attention to the correct information 
provided to them. 
Second, the limited research on the mitigating relationship between personality 
factors and susceptibility to the anchoring effect found how individuals with high 
conscientiousness and agreeableness, and low extraversion should be more susceptible to 
the anchoring effect (Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Eroglu and Croxton, 2010; McElroy and 
Dowd, 2007). Previous findings on conscientiousness and extraversion are not supported 
by the current study. In addition, findings of the present work contradict previous 
research on agreeableness and openness to experience (Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Eroglu 
and Croxton, 2010; McElroy and Dowd, 2007). In fact, in the present study, high 
agreeableness has been found to limit the susceptibility to the anchoring effect, and the 
same can be said about openness to experience. 
Other than the presented results from a statistical analysis, some results from 
differences in the mean of anchoring index across different individuals may be worth 
noting even if not statistically significant. A gender effect seems to exist; female subjects 
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seem to be ‘less affected’ by anchoring bias than male individuals. The same can be said 
for educated people; individuals with higher degrees seem to be ‘less affected’ than 
others. An exception has been found with reference to PhDs, which resulted to have 
higher mean of anchoring index than people with master degrees. Future research may 
find interest in examining such findings with broader studies. 
Several limitations are present within the current studies. The first relates to the 
selected measure of personality traits, which has been chosen because of its conciseness 
and brevity; however, its short length comes at the expense of reliability, a psychometric 
limitation that is indigenousness to all short instruments. Furthermore, such a short scale 
is able to offer only a broad assessment of the Big Five personality constructs; as noted 
by its authors, the TIPI is also unable to provide scores for facet-level constructs, which 
are often better predictors of specific criteria (Gosling et al., 2003; McElroy and Dowd, 
2007). Future research on this topic may benefit from using multi-item measures of the 
Big Five. The second limitation is shared with previous academic research and relates to 
the use of small size populations. This has been balanced with the use of a population 
more representative for managers than the usual student class. In fact, the average age of 
participants was about 43 years old and average working experience was about 19 years. 
6 Conclusions 
Although personality has been one of the most-studied topics in management and 
decision-making research, this stream of research has generated inconsistent support for 
the relationship between personality factors and the susceptibility to heuristics, and 
therefore biased judgment. 
This paper tested whether the five personality factors, namely extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience, as 
depicted by McCrae and Costa (1997, 1999) may influence individual sensitivity to 
anchor cues and in turn, individual judgments. In a task involving estimates about the 
year of completion of the Taj Mahal, the hypothesis that individual differences in 
personality would influence the reliability on a previously presented anchor have been 
examined. In order to operate with mobile anchors, differently from previous research 
that provided fixed anchors to participants, an anchoring index has been originally 
developed. 
From a managerial viewpoint, the results of the present work suggest how it is 
convenient to provide correct information to decision-makers when the risk of 
susceptibility to the anchoring effects exists. Moreover, agreeableness and openness to 
experience have been found to reduce susceptibility to the anchoring effect, suggesting 
that managers with those predominant personality factors should rely less on irrelevant 
information when making decisions. 
From this study, some interesting implications for future research directions on this 
topic also emerge. Some of them are related to the methods of this analysis. The fact  
that the current findings have not completely supported previous research and found  
non-analysed before relationships with reference to providing participants with correct 
information and personality traits opens some interesting venues for future research. 
These findings also pose interesting questions on how individual differences in 
personality traits may influence judgments for other heuristics and biases as well. This 
should be especially true for decision tasks affected by the reliance on external 
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information. One venue of research may involve the framing effect (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Previous research has chiefly examined relationships between 
personality traits and risk preference (Harms et al., 2012; Kourtidis et al., 2011; Zhao  
et al., 2010). Future research may want to explore whether this effect is due to reliance on 
external information (e.g., the frame) or whether it represents a general tendency among 
individuals with different personality traits. 
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